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NEUTRALITY WITHIN THE EU: 
CHALLENGING THE 
SWEDISH IDENTITY
Ed Regnier
Introduction
From 1521 to 1814, Sweden fought in
forty-eight wars, mostly in an effort to regain
territory. (Kruzel, p. 67) Since then, Sweden
has remained neutral, a record only matched
by Switzerland. Neutrality is not only the basis
of Swedish security policy; it is considered a
fundamental aspect of Sweden’s national iden-
tity. However, with recent changes in the world
security situation along with domestic finan-
cial strains, it is unclear how long this policy
will last. Sweden may be committed to the con-
cept “neutrality,” but its meaning is evolving so
much that its security policy is moving closer
to that of the other EU countries. How this evo-
lution will affect Sweden’s defense industry, its
relationship to Europe, and its role throughout
the world is highly debated and somewhat
unclear. However, it is certain that the Swedish
policy of neutrality is no longer as simple or
well defined as it once was. Sweden is in a peri-
od of change which it has not seen since it first
took a neutral position in 1814.
In this article, I begin with a discussion 
of the historical events that have shaped
Swedish security policy. This is followed by 
an evaluation of the issues that are changing
the security policy today. Finally, I discuss the
feasibility of maintaining neutrality from a
security, financial, social, and even ethical
standpoint. Although neutrality has served
Sweden very well, especially over the past cen-
tury, it is unclear how it will serve Sweden’s
future interests. 
History of Swedish Neutrality
Using the word “neutral” to describe a
country like Sweden often implies more about
its behavior than it should. The most basic def-
inition of neutrality is refraining from military
alliances with other countries during war. If
recognized in the international community as
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a truly neutral state, the neutral should never
be forced into a war due to an alliance. The
phrase that has become widely accepted as
describing Sweden’s security policy is “nonpar-
ticipation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at
neutrality in the event of war.” (Hagelin)
Although this definition generally applies to all
neutrals, there are certain additional qualities
specific to Sweden’s policy which distinguish it
from other neutral models such as Austria.
Sweden is not officially bound to neutral-
ity by any international agreements. In fact,
neutrality is not even mentioned in its own con-
stitution. However, due to its success, public
opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of neutral-
ity, and most political parties support it as well.
(Logue, p. 37) Sweden has successfully main-
tained neutrality since 1814. This is certainly a
welcome change from the period of 1521 to
1814 during which time Sweden was at war
more often than not. (Kruzel, p. 67) Swedish
neutrality has been achieved by maintaining
two fundamental objectives: legitimacy and
armament. Both of these objectives have devel-
oped due to historical events that almost forced
Sweden into war.
One such event that challenged Swedish
legitimacy came about when Sweden conduct-
ed talks with Germany in 1910. Sweden was
asking for a guarantee of assistance in case it
was attacked by Russia. Although Germany gave
no guarantee, northern Europe had significant
strategic importance geographically, giving
Russia reason to be skeptical of Swedish neu-
trality. (Wallin, p. 13) The event most detri-
mental to Swedish legitimacy took place in
1914 as World War I approached. Once again,
Russia feared Sweden would side with the
Germans. This time the suspicion was based on
the remarks of K.A. Wallenberg, the Swedish
Foreign Minister, who suggested that anti-
Russian feelings might make it hard to keep
Sweden out of the war. A comment like this all
but destroyed Sweden’s legitimacy as a neutral
at a time when neutrality was its best chance 
to avoid entering the war. On August 9, Russian
Admiral von Essen led a portion of the 
Baltic fleet towards Sweden with the task of
attacking parts of the Swedish navy stationed
near Gotland. Had he not received orders 
to turn around in the middle of the voyage 
from Russian military headquarters in St.
Petersburg, Sweden would have undoubtedly
been attacked and forced to enter the war. This
example demonstrates how absolutely vital it is
that there is no ambiguity as to a neutral’s
stance. The neutral must understand that other
countries may be skeptical of its stance, often
paranoid about secret alliances with adversaries,
and that the neutral must do everything it can
to convince them that it is non-aligned and will
not participate in war unless directly attacked.
After WWI, Sweden joined the League of
Nations, even though its joining conflicted with
its neutrality policy. Membership was seen as
improving its security and, as Lars Wallin
writes, “For a while ‘neutrality’ vanished from
the Swedish foreign policy vocabulary.” (Wallin,
p. 15) The League would prove ineffective at
preventing World War II, after which Sweden
would return to a revised neutral policy.
The objective of armament stemmed from
events leading up to WWII. Sweden, like many
other countries, tried to obtain military sup-
plies in order to protect itself against any state
that might attack; in this case Germany was the
dominant threat. Unfortunately for Sweden,
most countries from which it requested 
supplies, most notably the U.S., France and
England, were stockpiling supplies themselves.
(Hagelin) As a result, most orders were not
completed, and as the war approached,
Sweden’s military forces were not as strong as
she hoped. This weak defense system left
Sweden in a more vulnerable position to be
overtaken by an aggressor. As a result, defense
spending rapidly increased just before and dur-
ing the war, continuing through the 1950s.
Perhaps the best indicator of this rapid arma-
ment was that 11.8 percent of the Swedish GDP
was spent on defense in 1941. (Wallin, p. 23) By
way of comparison, approximately two percent
of GDP was spent on defense in 2002. Although
Sweden’s military power was increasing, its
ability to stay out of the war was also based on,
as would later be revealed, several arrange-
ments it made with Germany including con-
cessions which allowed German troops to trav-
el throughout Sweden. Although effective in
keeping Sweden out of the war, concessions like
these demonstrated the influence other coun-
tries could have on Swedish policy if it did not
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have sufficient military power to defend itself. 
Sweden’s vulnerability during WWII led to
a policy change after the war as Sweden adopt-
ed the “armed neutrality” model it still uses
today. Sustaining a multi-faceted defense indus-
try since then has allowed her to remain armed
without relying on other countries for military
equipment. According to John Logue, for an
“armed neutral” military power must “make the
cost of an attack... far outweigh the potential
benefits for any aggressor.” (Logue, p. 60) 
For the first decade after WWII, Kruzel
argues that “Swedish defense planning... was
based quite openly on the objective of being able
to hold out against an aggressor until foreign
military assistance arrived.” (Kruzel, p. 71)
Defense planning would eventually be revised
since this policy relied on assistance, an
assumption that implies an alignment of some
kind and thus compromises the neutral’s legit-
imacy. Since then, “armed neutrality” has been
a widely accepted policy in Sweden even though
high quality production in all fields of military
equipment and supplies places a considerable
burden on the country’s budget. 
Historically, the commitment to “armed
neutrality” has withstood the large military
expenditures required. However, recent eco-
nomic struggles combined with a large welfare
state are challenging the importance and prac-
ticality of this commitment. Although the
Swedish welfare state provides citizens a wide
variety of services and is quite successful in
keeping the economic and social gaps between
classes from growing, the high taxes required
by it put a considerable strain on the economy.
Recently, with globalization lowering the cost
of labor, Swedish companies have struggled to
remain competitive with their high labor costs
and corporate taxes. In addition to the effects
of globalization, Sweden’s low birth rate and
substantial increase in immigration have left a
decreasing tax base to support a population that
is not as productive as it used to be. With these
burdens in mind, it is clear that a successful
welfare state is now more difficult to obtain.
Therefore, in order to maintain the important
social services of the welfare system, it may be
necessary to reevaluate other large sources of
government spending such as military defense
expenditures. 
Sweden vs. Other Neutrals
The level of military expenditure, for a small
country like Sweden, is considered high through-
out the international community. The primary
reason for a high level of military expenditure,
already discussed in some detail,  is that it is nec-
essary to protect against aggressors since no assis-
tance from other countries can be expected. This
heavy burden is magnified to some degree due to
the geography and demography of Sweden. In
general, the fewer people and the more land a
country has, the harder it is to protect against
outside threats. Sweden consists of about 174,000
sq. miles and is home to approximately nine mil-
lion people. This equates to one of the largest
land-per-capita ratios in Europe. The long nation-
al borders of Sweden require a sophisticated mil-
itary defense capable of covering large areas, espe-
cially for the less-populated north. This is one of
the reasons Sweden places such a high priority
on maintaining its aircraft industry. Figure 1
shows that military expenditure per person
(ME/Pop) is much higher in Sweden than in the
other European neutral countries. If Sweden also
had a much higher GDP per capita, the higher
ME/Pop would be understandable. However,
Figure 2 shows that this is not the case. Sweden
spends, on average, about one percent more of its
GDP on military expenditure than do the other
European neutrals.
Clearly, there are significant differences
between Sweden and the other neutrals in terms
of military spending. These differences can large-
ly be explained according to each country’s
unique geographic and/or political situation. 
For example: 
• Ireland is protected geographically with
its only neighbor being the U.K. Any
invasion would have to be by sea.
• Switzerland’s terrain is very mountain-
ous and would be extremely difficult to
occupy. 
• Finland’s neutrality had been guaran-
teed by the Soviet Union. Invasion would
have caused involvement of the neigh-
boring superpower.
• Austrian neutrality was agreed upon by
the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet
Union in 1955 as part of the State Treaty
for Austria. (Ewing, p. 5) 
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Compared to these neutrals, Sweden
requires a very high level of military expenditure.
The multi-faceted defense industry required is
quite expensive, in large part due to the cost of
indigenous research and development (R&D).
One way to counter these costs is through the
exportation of arms, a policy that makes sense
economically but raises social concerns and pos-
sibly conflicts with Sweden’s foreign policy.
Arms Exports
The Swedish government allows arms
exports for several reasons. Exports allow for
longer production runs and therefore have the
potential to lower the price per unit, an obvi-
ous benefit to the government, through the
achievement of economies of scale. The more
arms sold, the less the defense company is
spending on R&D per product. Exports are also
allowed for security reasons. Since Sweden is a
small country, the time between domestic
orders can be quite long. If defense companies
were only allowed to sell to Sweden, they could
go years without orders and would likely go out
of business. Exports sustain the industry, keep-
Figure 1
2002 Military Expenditure (ME) per Person
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and U.S. Census Bureau.
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Military Expenditure as a Share (%) of GDP
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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ing it active and continuously developing. Not
only is the industry better off when Sweden
places orders, it is more capable of rapid pro-
duction in case Sweden were to suddenly be
attacked and require large armaments. The
“Report on Sweden’s Export Control Policy and
Exports of Military Equipment in 2002” states
that for a country like Sweden “it is a major
security and a defence policy interest to main-
tain its capability and development and pro-
duction capacity in the defence industry sec-
tor.... Some exports are necessary in order to
meet Swedish defence needs in the long term.”
(“Report...,” p. 4) Figure 3 shows that exports
have accounted for approximately one third of
the defense industry’s sales over the past
decade. 
Clearly, there are substantial economic
and security benefits to Sweden in allowing
arms exports. However, there are social and for-
eign policy concerns that must also be consid-
ered. For example, Sweden’s foreign policy is
based on increasing world stability since this
decreases the chance of Sweden being forced
into conflict. Therefore, it may seem counter-
intuitive for Sweden to export arms. However,
Sweden has a strict export policy, especially
when compared with other EU countries.
According to the “Report on Sweden’s Export
Control Policy,” “Exports of military equipment
are thus only permitted if they are justified for
security or defence reasons and do not conflict
with Sweden’s foreign policy.” (“Report...,” p. 4)
More specifically, Sweden does not export to
countries that are at war or that violate inter-
national law. For each possible export sale, the
situation in the recipient country is also evalu-
ated for both the probability of conflict in the
future and possible human rights violations.
Sweden only wants to export arms to countries
that it feels will never use them, especially on
its own people. As a general policy, Sweden
prefers only to export to the developed Western
nations. In 2002, for example, 64 percent of mil-
itary equipment exports went to Nordic, North
American and Western European countries, as
well as Australia and New Zealand. (“Report...,”
p. 42)
Despite its strict export policy, Swedish
weapons have nonetheless surfaced in countries
that were not approved for exports. Most of
these cases involved smuggling. For example,
in 1987 Nobel Industries admitted that two of
its units, Bofors AB and Nobel Kemi AB, smug-
gled weapons to embargoed countries in the
Middle East. If an export destination could not
be approved under the Swedish export policy,
arrangements were made to export to an
Figure 3
Percentage of Sweden’s Military Sales That Are Exports
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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approved country that would then export to the
restricted country. (“Nobel Industries...”)
Although there have been numerous cases
involving smuggling, the Swedish government
is guilty of more than just not effectively polic-
ing exports. Substantiated reports have also sur-
faced of a secret deal between Prime Minister
Olaf Palme and India’s Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi in 1986 that included the sale of $1.3
billion worth of Bofors howitzers. It is estimat-
ed that $250 million of this was in the form of
bribes. Although it is alleged that Palme may
have pocketed some of the bribe money, he also
made the deal for political reasons. Bofors was
struggling at the time, needing a large order to
preserve jobs. It also needed some sort of advan-
tage over the competing French weapon that
the Indian generals preferred. (Gupte and
Singh, p. 113) Although the deal is still being
investigated, few question that the deal actual-
ly occurred and that bribes were involved.
Today, there is still pressure from the public and
government officials in both Sweden and India
to find answers as to what really happened. The
long standing of the public interest in the scan-
dal shows just how much concern there is that
the export policy is implemented correctly. 
Cases of arms smuggling are not common,
nor should it be implied that Sweden is con-
tinuously supplying weapons to actors in unsta-
ble situations. However, when Swedish weapons
are found in restricted countries or are used in
war, it does not reflect well for Sweden’s export
policy. If increasing world stability is a prima-
ry goal of Sweden, both from a security and an
ethical standpoint, the following question must
be asked: Is maintaining a self-sufficient indus-
try which requires exports worth the problems
that those exports may cause abroad?
Swedish weapons were used in the Iraq-
Iran war of the 1980s and have also been used
in the India-Pakistan conflict. (“Annual Report
on Swedish Arms...”) The India-Pakistan con-
flict has drawn considerable attention since it
seems Sweden has helped arm both Pakistan
and India. Although sales to India are better
documented than those to Pakistan, Sweden
has exported personal snowmobiles to Pakistan
to be used for military operations. (Miller and
Brooks) However, the Swedish government has
regretted some of its sales to the region. For
example, in 2002 the Swedish Foreign Minister
Anna Lindh said that government authoriza-
tion for the sale of new Bofors mortars to India
would be “unthinkable” because previous
Bofors exports there had played an important
role in the “serious global conflict” with
Pakistan. (“Swedish Foreign Minister Rules
Out...”) Recognizing that maintaining a self-
sufficient defense industry is difficult and is
prone to corrupt arms transactions, the public
backlash indicates concern that “armed neu-
trality” is difficult to implement ethically.
Perhaps obtaining self-sufficiency has under-
mined Sweden’s security policy objectives and
ethical standards. 
Even if ethical standards are ignored to
pursue only the best interests of Sweden and it
is determined that certain exported arms to
unstable countries will never be used in a con-
flict in the vicinity of Sweden, there still may
be reason not to export to these countries —
namely, immigration. As Ångström notes, “Out
of the refugees that arrived in Sweden between
1983 and 1994, the Swedish peace movement
has shown that 65 percent came from warring
countries where Sweden during the same peri-
od had supplied arms to one of the parties.”
(Ångström et al., as quoted in Hermele, p. 154).
I am not suggesting that Swedish exports are
causing immigration problems in Sweden. Most
countries from which the immigrants origi-
nated were not stable to begin with. However,
Sweden’s exports may have in some way con-
tributed to problems in other countries, which
makes a strong case for reevaluating the export
policy. In addition, most countries in the
Western world are decreasing the size of their
weapons stockpiles. As a result, the export mar-
ket to developed countries is also decreasing.
(Skoie, p. 143) Unfortunately, it seems that if
Sweden wants to continue exporting as a means
to maintaining its defense industry, it would
need a less restrictive policy. Therefore, alter-
natives which replace or, more likely, decrease
dependence on exports make sense from both
an ethical and security standpoint. 
Sweden’s need to decrease military expen-
diture comes at a time when weapons systems
are becoming more sophisticated and, conse-
quently, more expensive than ever. Even though
Sweden is a small country, expensive weapons
 
71
systems are a problem for many larger
European countries as well. As Schmitt points
out, part of the problem is that “European
countries are burdened by costly duplication.
As a consequence, the EU as a whole receives
much less value in exchange for its military
spending than the U.S.” (Schmitt) As a result,
it is difficult to compete with the powerful
industry of the U.S. From a security standpoint,
Europeans need to keep a strong, competitive
defense industry; otherwise, they will have to
rely solely on the U.S. industry. As the Swedish
Minister of Defense, Björn von Sydow, has said,
“In the long run it would be devastating to the
world if there is only one monopoly supplier
controlling every high tech development and
with its parliament, its Congress, controlling
into detail the regulations for exportation and
co-operation in this field.” (Sydow)
To resolve these financial and security
dilemmas, in 1997 a Letter of Intent (LoI) was
signed by the six biggest arms producers in the
EU: Spain, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy and
Sweden. The LoI laid out a commitment to
develop what today is known as the Framework
Agreement, which is discussed below. Although
the Agreement has great economic potential for
all six parties involved, it is unclear whether
Sweden can maintain the strict export policy or
truly domestic defense industry it has had since
WWII. 
Framework Agreement
The 1990s witnessed a merger trend
among defense companies based in different
countries, forming what are known as “trans-
national defense companies (TDCs).” (Bauer)
With these TDCs came complications as to
which countries’ export guidelines and regula-
tions the companies had to obey. Coupled with
the growing financial strains of arms produc-
tion throughout Europe, the six member states
previously mentioned addressed the inevitable
changes in the defense industry by forming the
Framework Agreement (FA). 
Although the FA proposes cooperation at
a number of different levels such as informa-
tion exchange and research, there are two areas
that clearly indicate a shift in Swedish security
policy. Article 4 of the FA states that the “like-
ly consequences of industrial restructuring will
be the creation of TDCs, possible abandonment
of national industrial capacity and thus 
the acceptance of mutual dependence.”
(Framework Agreement) “Mutual dependence”
is not a term often associated with Swedish
security policy. Sweden is moving away from
self-sufficiency in hopes of lowering military
costs, a decision which, although understand-
able, must be noted as a distinct change in pol-
icy. However, other aspects of the FA have
drawn more criticism. As Miller and Brooks
note, “Some NGOs... are highly critical of the
Framework Agreement and the process related
to its development and implementation, as it
has lacked transparency and places industry pri-
orities above other concerns.” (Miller and
Brooks) Possibly the most controversial con-
cern is in regard to the “white lists” which will
name all the countries that can receive arms
exports. The “white lists” are seen as a way of
leveling the playing field for those countries
that historically have had more restrictive
export policies. Swedish companies, for exam-
ple, will no longer be at a competitive disad-
vantage compared to companies from the less-
restrictive U.K. The “white lists” will also
eliminate the problems associated with TDCs
using the exporting country with the more
lenient export policy. Although a list of
approved export destinations is good for the
industry, skeptics like the Swedish Peace and
Arbitration Society (SPAS) fear the list will use
standards of the lowest common denominator.
It is suspected that for Sweden, a country that
has had a very strict export policy, the list of
countries it exports to will grow considerably,
a compromise of which many disapprove. For
example, of all the six member states, Sweden
has been the only country that has not allowed
exports to Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey. (“European Arms
Industry...”) 
If the FA does in fact decrease production
costs, according to the “armed neutral” model
previously described the need for exports would
decrease. However, because of the new trans-
national nature of the defense industry coupled
with a potentially more lenient export policy,
the FA may even lead to an increase in exports.
Regardless of whether that in fact happens, the
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FA is a distinct step for Sweden away from tra-
ditional security policy in the direction of
“mutual dependence.” The FA is a clear indica-
tion that Sweden is adjusting to the post-Cold-
War security situation. Swedish legitimacy will
no longer be based on self-sufficiency but rather
a common European identity. 
The New Defense
Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden’s
role in Europe has drastically changed since she
no longer holds as much strategic significance
geographically. Today the Swedish government
describes its defense policies as aiming to “make
a greater contribution to collective security in
Europe, both through diplomacy and defence
resources,” (“The New Defence...,” p. 3) where-
as before it focused solely on staying out of a
war between the superpowers.
With the threat of invasion considered to
be low, the Swedish government has recently
begun implementing “The New Defence” which
focuses less on traditional military threats and
more on increasing the efficiency and adapt-
ability of its defense resources. Now that the
shadow of the Soviet Union has dispersed,
Sweden’s involvement in international crisis
management is growing, which in turn calls for
different types of military capabilities. 
Sweden still plans to continue its policy of
military non-alignment even though it will
undoubtedly be challenged as other members of
the EU look to further unify Europe. Talk of a
common EU defense policy has been ongoing
and, although Sweden and the other neutrals of
the EU have made it clear they will not approve
of it, eventually it may not be practical for Sweden
to maintain its non-aligned status. However, in
the near future it does not seem like the lack of
a common EU defense policy will hinder eco-
nomic and social efforts within the EU. 
Although the opportunity to become more
involved in Europe has obvious benefits from a
security and financial standpoint, it will be dif-
ficult for Sweden to maintain the identity it
desires. Sweden has been pushed away from the
truly neutral standing it has had for so long
because of the new, post-Cold-War security sit-
uation, along with the financial challenges to
the welfare state caused by the globalized econ-
omy. Sweden is now left in a critical period of
change with many questions and no simple
answers. Will Sweden always be accepted in the
EU without making military alliances? Will the
decrease in self-sufficiency hinder Sweden’s
ability to stay neutral? 
How will the defense industry develop?
Whatever the answers are, it is clear that the
future of Sweden, specifically its defense indus-
try, its economy and its security policy, will
never be as isolated or independent in nature
as it once was.
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